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ABSTRACT 
Decision tree induction systems are being used 
for knowledge acquisition. Yet they have been 
developed without proper regard for the subjective 
Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This 
paper examines the problem tackled by these 
systems from the Bayesian view in order to 
interpret the systems and the heuristic methods 
they use. It is shown that decision tree systems 
depart from the usual Bayesian methods by 
implicitly incorporating prior belief that the 
simpler of two hypotheses will be preferred, all 
else being equal. They perform a greedy search 
of the space of rules to find one in which there is 
strong posterior belief. 
Keywords induction, binary classification, 
similarity, decision trees. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A common task in knowledge-based systems 
is inducing a rule to handle simple binary 
classification. Given a set of classified (positive 
and negative) examples of some concept, the task 
is to develop a classification rule to predict the 
class of further unclassified examples. It is· 
performed by induction systems as an aid to 
knowledge acquisition [Michalski 1983, Quinlan, 
Compton, Horn and Lazarus 1986] when 
examples are available but more general 
knowledge is not. 
Decision tree induction systems are 
particularly good at this task. There are two 
independently developed families of systems, 
first, ID3 [Quinlan 1986a], ACLS [Paterson and 
Niblett 1983] and its commercial derivatives, and 
secondly, the CART suite of programs [Breiman, 
Friedman, Olshen and Stone 1984]. Both 
families have a string of industrial and academic 
successes to their credit [Breiman et al. 1984, 
Quinlan 1986a, 1986b]. 
These systems can be viewed from two key 
vantage-points. The first is from the cognitive 
scientist's view. The following questions are 
indicative. What is the cognitive environment in 
which the system operates? How should the 
system best facilitate knowledge acquisition from 
an expert? The second is from the statistician's 
view: what is the formulation of the problem and 
how should the system make the best decision? 
Both aspects are vital to the understanding and 
engineering of a successful system. 
This paper is cast in the statistician's view. 
No rational argument can deny that the subjective 
Bayesian theory of induction provides a correct 
framework for the task these systems are tackling 
[Horvitz, Beckerman and Langlotz 1986]. Not 
one of these systems, however, is based on the 
Bayesian theory. 
I believe it is important to resolve this 
apparent conflict between theory and practice in 
order to clarify and further develop these 
pragmatic systems. This may allow us, for 
instance, to consider how they may be improved 
or what their current scope of application is. 
Also, I believe it is important to elucidate the 
role that statistics plays in understanding 
operational induction systems, so that other less 
precise issues (such as the cognitive environment 
in which they operate) can also be understood. 
The exposition proceeds as follows. After 
discussing the induction task in more detail, I 
review the Bayesian approach, assuming 
examples come from a (possibly culled) 
historical database. Within this framework, I 
investigate implications of the knowledge 
acquisition context to this approach, in 
particular, what form of prior may be suitable. I 
then discuss and interpret the decision tree 
induction systems ID3 and ID3 with pruning 
[Quinlan 1986b, Quinlan et al. 1986]. 
2. THE INDUCTION TASK 
For the induction task in the knowledge 
acquisition context, we typically have an expert 
who is sufficiently knowledgeable to formulate 
the problem for us and is in possession of a 
training set (a set of objects whose classification 
are known). The task is to develop a 
classification rule to predict the class of further, 
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unclassified examples. I consider here only two­
class induction: each object is either a positive or 
negative instance of some concept under study. 
The problem formulation is done as follows. 
The objects are grouped into different types. In a 
given problem a particular type of object is 
usually associated with a particular description in 
terms of an expert-supplied language, consisting 
of, say, 10-30 attributes. Each attribute may be 
binary ("true" or "false"), multi-valued, or real­
valued [Quinlan 1986b]. Only the simple binary 
case is considered here. 
Quinlan et al. [1986] present an induction 
problem where objects correspond to patients that 
attended a laboratory for endocrine analysis. Each 
patient is described in terms of attributes such as 
sex, age, pregnant and on-lithium. Two patients 
are considered to be of the same type if they have 
the same attribute values. One binary 
classification of patients is whether they are 
hypothyroid or not hypothyroid. 
The training set available for this problem is a 
set of some 4000 recent medical records. Older 
records are not comparable as different or less 
accurate measurements were recorded. In the 
knowledge acquisition context training sets rarely 
have more than several thousand examples, 
several hundred is more common. This is 
because the economics or time-scale of a problem 
usually limits the amount of data available. 
A critical part of the decision tree approach to 
induction is the selection of the language (the 
attributes) [Michie 1986a]. The attributes chosen 
are often ones that experts consider useful for 
classification. For instance, they could be key 
primitives on which they traditionally base their 
decisions, or attributes that are relevant according 
to some causal or incomplete theory. Michie 
claims that in practice experts can often articulate 
useful attributes when they do not have a 
sufficient mental grip on their task to articulate 
rules. 
A classification rule can be selected on a 
number of grounds. In the above hypothyroid 
example we may be required to decide whether to 
treat a patient, or to predict the odds against a 
patient being hypothyroid. The "best" rule may 
be one that performs its function with a high 
predictive accuracy. But with knowledge-based 
systems where accountability is important and 
experts seek to understand or assess rules 
themselves, rules also have to be comprehensible 
[Michie 1986a]. This is a cognitive constraint. 
A huge lookup table of decisions indexed by 
thousands of different types of objects could not 
be comprehensible due to its complexity. 
A knowledge engineer would typically guide 
the expert in a cyclic process of performing 
induction, evaluating the worth of rules, and 
perhaps modifying the problem formulation or 
augmenting the training set 
3. THE STATISTICIAN'S VIEW 
Rule induction is in fact a generalization of 
the simple Bernoulli trial, treated in most 
elementary statistical test books. A common 
example is the public opinion poll. Suppose 
you want to decide whether a majority of people 
support trade-based unions and have posed the 
question to a random sample of 150 people. 
How do you make an educated guess given this 
data? This is a binary classification problem 
where, in the terminology above, there is only a 
single type of object, the "person", and the 
classes are "support" and "do not support". 
The subjective Bayesian approach to this 
simple problem has been analysed in depth by 
Howard [1970]. Induction is decomposed into 
two processes, belief analysis to determine 
posterior belief followed by decision analysis to 
obtain the best decision [Raiffa and Schlaifer 
1961]. 
Assumptions 
To determine posterior belief, the way the 
training set is obtained and prior belief need to be 
modelled. I shall consider the situation where the 
training set represents a historical database, 
perhaps modified to include sufficient examples 
of rare cases and to exclude excessive redundancy 
of common cases. The following assumptions 
apply: 
(1) the distribution of objects and their class 
does not vary over time, 
(2) objects in the training set are drawn 
from the population independently of 
their class, 
(3) the training set is completed in a non­
informative manner [Raiffa and Schlaifer 
1961],and 
(4) prior belief about class given type is 
independent of prior belief about the 
distribution of object types. 
For instance, objects could be selected to ensure 
the training set includes a representative coverage 
of the different possible types and assumption (2) 
still holds as long as the selection method is not 
influenced by the classification of the objects. 
Assumption (3) would not apply if the expert 
considered the training set sufficient to 
demonstrate the concept under study, or had hand­
crafted the training set as a tutorial set of 
examples [Michie 1986a, 1986b]. Prior belief is 
further discussed in the next section. 
To model the decision-making process assume 
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the following scenario. In the available training 
set class corresponds to an expert's (or the best­
in-hindsight) yes/no decision about objects 
[Michie 1986b]. The system is required to 
emulate this example decision-making as closely 
as possible, and provide a concise rule explaining 
its behaviour. The system could attempt to 
minimize the expected number of errors in 
classification. This, of course, is only suitable 
when the payoff structure (the relative cost of 
success and failure) is reasonably constant. 
Furthermore, the concern for comprehensibility 
has been ignored. Nevertheless, I shall adopt this 
criterion here as it happens to be a common 
measure on which decision trees are judged. 
Notation 
Let C be the number of different types of 
objects. For instance, with 15 binary-valued 
attributes there are 215 different descriptions we 
can assign to an object. That is, C=32,000. For 
i=l..C, let A; represent the proportion of objects 
of type i that would occur in a very large number 
of examples and 4>; represent the proportion of 
those objects of type i that are positive instances. 
These are well defined by assumption (1). So 
('A ,-4>;) represents the proportion of positive 
instances of objects of type i, ('A ;(1-4> ;)) 
represents the proportion of negative instances, 
and I.i=l..c'Ai = 1. Let P; be the number of positive 
instances of the i-th type in the training set and 
n; be likewise for negative instances. Let the 
size of the training set be equal to n, so 
Li=t .. c(p;+n;)=n. 
Analysing Belief 
Current belief abou� objects and their 
classification can be represented by a density 
function on Q,.,.t), vectors of the real numbers A; 
and 4> ;· .Q would parameterize a particular 
classification rule and 2. would parameterize how 
different types of objects are distributed. By 
Bayes theorem and assumptions (2), (3) and (4), 
for the marginal posterior belief about m_ 
Posterior(§) oc Prior�)·lli=l .. C4>fi(1--(jl;),.; (1) 
In addition, 2. and m_ are independent according to 
posterior belief as well prior. After some 
manipulation, (1) becomes 
log Posterior@= (2) 
log Prior�) +constant 
- n-HV('f,.$;, f;(l-$;); 'A,-4>;. 'A;(l--41;)) 
where HV is a measure of discrimination 
information [Shore 1985], 2.. is any arbitrary 
proportions and t_ and l_ are the maximum 
likelihood proportions given the sample statistics 
(p;.n;) for i=l..C. That is, 'A"; =(p;+n)/n and 
$Fp;f(p;+n;) for i=l. .C. 
Formula (2) can be interpreted as follows 
[Cheeseman 1984]. The first term on the right 
hand side is proportional to the complexity of the 
rule m_ in an efficient encoding according to prior 
belief and the HV term is a measure of the error 
between the rule � and the observed proportions 
in the data. So posterior belief in a rule is a trade 
off between the prior complexity and its observed 
error weighted by the size of the training set 
The Best Decision 
The induction system is to decide whether 
each type of object should be classed as positive 
or negative. Such a decision can be represented 
by a decision tree with tests on attributes at its 
nodes and positive or negative at its leaves. The 
cost in terms of probability of error of a 
particular decision given that � are the true 
proportions is1 
Cost(decision,Q,.,m.)) = 
Li=l..C')..i ( (1-4>;}-1ctecide i is +ve 
+ <l>t 1ctecide i is -ve) 
The posterior expectation of this cost represents 
the expected number of errors. It needs to be 
minimized. With some manipulation using the 
posterior independence of 21. and �. it can be 
shown we should decide to classify an object of 
type i as a positive instance if and only if 
Ei4>J;::1-E._(<!>;). that is, E_..(4>;)�.5. 
Rermement 
Though at this point a statistician would have 
considered the analysis complete (apart from the 
choice of prior), further work remains for the 
purposes of knowledge acquisition. The final 
result should be presented in a manner 
comprehensible to the expert. A final refinement 
process is needed to convert proposed decisions to 
knowledge, for example, comprehensible rules. 
Where comprehensibility is at the cost of a 
potential decrease in accuracy [Quinlan 1986b], 
the two processes of decision analysis and 
knowledge refinement further interact. This 
interaction is not investigated here. 
4. CHOOSING A PRIOR 
Suppose there is no prior belief correlating the 
1 The characteristic function 1A equals 1 when 
A is true and 0 otherwise. 
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classifications of different types of objects. Then 
by prior independence and relation (1), posterior 
belief in the positive classification of an object 
of type i would be 
Posteri�r(�J oc Prior(�J-�f(l-4>i)ni 
Consequently, only examples of the i-th type 
would reveal further information about �i· This 
means for C=32,000, hundreds of thousands of 
examples are typically needed to reach a 
reasonable decision if the problem is dealing with 
uncertainty, and tens of thousands if the problem 
is in a logical domain (where a priori each �i is 
either 0 or 1). 
These numbers contrast with ·the training set 
sizes discussed in Section 2. Yet decision tree 
induction systems are recording successes with 
these limited training sets. This is experimental 
confirmation that in the typical knowledge 
acquisition problem significant correlation is 
often justified a priori between different types of 
objects and decision tree induction systems must 
be implicitly taking advantage of this. I 
investigate this second issue in detail in the next 
section. It is a justification of the first issue that 
concerns us here. 
In the general framework outlined in Section 
2, the only problem input that could affect prior 
belief is the experts' choice of language. The 
experts believe the attributes chosen are "useful" 
for classification. If they are basing this on a 
partial theory or they have shown a credible 
performance in the past (not just on the training 
set provided), there is reason to support their 
belief in the usefulness of the attributes. But, 
how does this "usefulness" translate into a prior? 
Clearly, there is no simple or precise answer to 
this question. 
The study of cognitive heuristics in 
behavioural decision theory has led to some 
understanding of how experts think [Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974, Cleaves 1986]. A key heuristic 
is representativeness. In the current context, this 
says an expert will attempt to classify objects 
similarly if they are similar in the expert's view. 
Though in general this heuristic has no statistical 
basis, if we have some reason to trust the 
experts' judgement we should place some 
credibility in the heuristic relative to the 
language proposed. Common sense tells us that 
the experts will have taylored their language so 
that this heuristic is indeed applicable. Afterall, 
similarity is a language dependent concept 
[Watanabe 1969, Thm. 7.20]. 
Another argument goes as follows. Knowing 
that attributes are useful indicates they have good 
discriminating power. When determining class, 
this could mean few attributes need to be tested 
or the cognitive process involved is relatively 
simple. This suggests that the simpler of two 
hypotheses should be preferred, all else being 
equal. Rendell uses this kind of argument to 
justify selective induction [1986]. 
The kinds of prior knowledge the above 
arguments suggest-similar objects are more 
likely to have similarly classes, and simpler 
hypotheses are preferred-are not ar odds with 
each other. They often occur simultaneously. 
Due to the level of detail that the above 
arguments support, they may as well be treated 
as one and the same. I shall refer to either kind 
of prior, when made on the basis of trust in the 
expert's judgement, as the similarity hypothesis. 
This is "subjective" Bayesianism taken to the 
extreme, but when faced with a paucity of data it 
represents the best use of scant resources. It is 
used in the following analysis. 
5. A NA LY SI NG D EC IS I O N  T REE 
INDUCTION SYSTEMS 
Stepl @ Step2 
Step3 
Figure 1. Growing a tree. 
The basic decision tree approach is as follows. 
Trees are grown in a top-down manner. Starting 
from a tree consisting of only one node, each leaf 
is repeatedly turned into a branch node by placing 
a test for one of the attributes at the node and 
constructing branches from it corresponding to 
each outcome of the test. Fig. 1 demonstrates 
three initial steps in this process. In step 2, a 
test on attribute b has been added at the root node 
and the two leaves below remain to be grown. 
During the process, a heuristic called a splitting 
rule is used to select an attribute to form the test 
at the node being grown. Both Breiman et al. 
[1984, p. 102] and Quinlan [1986a, p. 90] 
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suggest as a splitting rule an information-based 
heuristic that Quinlan calls gain2. 
For problems not involving uncertainty, 
arguments in favour of this basic approach take 
many forms [Quinlan 1986a, Rendell 1986] but 
ultimately boil down to the following: simpler 
trees that fit the data are better. Bayesian 
analysis says that the approach can only yield 
repeated success when simpler trees can be 
expected to perform adequately in the long run on 
the class of problems being tackled. That is, the 
similarity hypothesis must hold. 
When a decision tree system is applied to 
problems involving uncertainty, it has been 
found experimentally that the trees grown using 
�he basic approach can have their accuracy 
Improved by afterwards pruning some sections of 
the tree [Breiman et al. 1984, Chap. 3, Quinlan 
1986a, 1986b, Quinlan et al. 1986]. This is 
achieved by turning subtrees into leaves and then 
using some function to assign classes to the new 
leaf nodes. Fig. 2 demonstrates a simple 
application. Quinlan also uses pruning for 
refining knowledge; in this case the aim is to 
decrease the complexity of the tree without 
significantly decreasing the accuracy. It is a 
fortunate coincidence that pruning can sometimes 
lead to more accurate trees and perform the 
knowledge refinement process as well. The two 
aims should be separated out in analysis 
however. I consider only the former aim here. 
Pl 
8 
Tree 
Figure 2. Pruning a tree3. 
2 I. . t 1s also an estimate of the mutual 
information [Shore 1986] between the class and 
the attribute. 
3 P 1 is obtained by pruning Tree at the node 
Usi?g maximum likelihood statistics (by 
removmg the complexity term in equation (2)), 
pruning cannot be justified as a means of 
reducing errors. For example, suppose there is a 
single negative example of a certain type of 
object and all similar objects in the training set 
are classified as positive. So when a tree is 
grown using the standard approach, the negative 
example would appear as a single negative branch 
and all neighbouring branches would be positive. 
Pruning would often discard this single negative 
branch and absorb it into a neighbouring positive 
branch. By a maximum likelihood approach, 
however, only one negative example of that 
particular type has been seen so the best decision 
(in terms of minimum errors) must be negative. 
In fact, by a related argument, pruning as a 
means of improving accuracy can only be 
justified under a Bayesian analysis when the prior 
conforms to something like the similarity 
hypothesis. 
Can we justify decision tree methods from a 
Bayesian argument? Instead of explaining these 
methods in detail, I shall develop a similar 
method from frrst principles and compare it with 
the experimentally determined methods. 
Rather than evaluating Et(ci>J�.5. consider 
making a decision whether objects of the i-th 
type should be positive based on whether 4>,�.5 
for some classification rule .m_ in which there is 
high posterior belief. This is a reasonable test of 
whether Eic!>J;;::0.5 because, frrst, prior belief 
should be symmetric about 4>,=0.5, and second, 
posterior belief is obtained by weighting the 
prior by a unimodal likelihood term (the error 
term in equation (2) raised to the power 2). As 
the number in the training set increases this 
estimate is guaranteed to approach the true �alue 
because the error term will dominate. 
The Splitting Rule 
For anN attribute problem there are some 2'J!'1 
possible decision trees. To search this space, the 
greedy top-down approach advocated by Breiman 
et al. and Quinlan can be adopted. A splitting 
rule, a heuristic, is needed to guess which 
attribute should be tested at each step. 
S�ppose we did test on a particular attribute; 
consider the tree that results. Fig. 3 represents a 
tree after a new test on some attribute Xj has 
been added, resulting in two new leaf nodes 
testing b, and P2 by pruning at the node testing 
a. The method of reassigning a class to a leaf 
node has not been shown. 
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below it A family of rules (each in the form ,m) 
can be constructed from this tree by assigning 
different proportions to each leaf-node to 
representing the chance that an object at the node 
will be positive (assume the proportions are 
constant for all object types that would appear at 
one node). Each of these rules is referred to as an 
underlying rule. Fig. 4 represents such a rule for 
the tree in Fig. 3. 
j!J 0 
(Pj,l•nj,l) 
@ 
Figure 3. Considering the j-th attribute. 
A 1-ply lookahead heuristic is as follows: 
select the attribute that leads to a tree with an 
underlying rule .t of greatest posterior 
probability. Under reasonable assumptions 
concerning the prior, this heuristic is shown 
below to be the same as selecting the attribute 
maximizing Quinlan's gain. Notice, however, 
that the set of underlying rules generated from 
using, say, a four-valued attribute as the new test 
will have greater dimensionality (because of four 
branches rather than two) and consequently more 
flexibility to match the data by chance than for a 
binary attribute. Not surprisingly, it has been 
reported that the gain heuristic is biased towards 
multi-valued attributes [Kononenko, Bratko and 
Roskar 1984]. 
Figure 4. An underlying rule. 
The relative posterior probability of 
underlying rules can be determined using (2). If 
the prior probability of a rule m. is determined 
only by the "simplicity"/"adherence to 
similarity" of the rule or its underlying decision 
tree, then it will be relatively constant for all 
rules considered as they have equivalent 
underlying trees except for a different attribute at 
one node. So the contribution of the prior can be 
ignored. Certainly, it can be when the number of 
examples occurring at the node are large, as the 
error component of the posterior will dominate. 
Only the error terms need be compared. In 
fact, by the nature of the sum in the error term, 
only the contribution made by the new test and 
its leaves need be compared. Suppose the j-th 
attribute is used as the test. Let (pj,l•nj,1) be the 
number of positive and negative examples 
respectively occurring at the "yes" leaf node of 
the new test, (pj;..nj� the numbers at the "no" 
node, and <llj; the proportions assigned to these 
nodes by an underlying rule. This situation is 
represented in Fig. 3. The contribution to the 
error term then becomes (taking the logarithm of 
the corresponding term in relation (1), and 
assuming all attributes are binary) 
(lin) 'L;=1,2Pj,i ·log<!lj,i + nj,i·log(1--4>j) 
The maximum of this w.r.t. <llj,i for the j-th 
attribute is 
(1/n) 'Li=l,2 ( Pj,i·log(pj)(pj;+nj,;)) 
+ nj,i·log(nj)(pj,i+nj,i))) 
which is a constant, monotonic function of 
Quinlan's gain of the j-th attribute. So to find 
the attribute that when used has the tree with an 
underlying rule .t of greatest posterior 
probability, the attribute with the maximum gain 
should be chosen. 
Stopping and Pruning 
When should tree growing be stopped? As a 
tree is grown, the maximum posterior 
probability of any underlying rule will not 
necessarily increase to a maximum and then 
decrease. The tree may have to reach a certain 
level of complexity before any underlying rule 
will show a significant decrease in error. In 
otherwords, a certain number of questions may 
need to be asked before any reasonable estimate 
of the class can be made. The parity problem is 
an extreme example4. Knowing only 7 bits of 
an 8-bit word gives no clue whatsoever about the 
parity of the word. So growing cannot be 
stopped once the maximum posterior probability 
of any underlying rule for the tree decreases. 
4 Incidentally, parity is also an extreme 
counterexample of "decision tree simplicity" and 
"adherence to similarity". 
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But the tree can be grown to its full extent 
using the gain heuristic and then the best nodes 
for pruning can be found in hindsight. The 
resultant tree can be pruned back to the subtree 
with an underlying rule of maximum posterior 
probability. This is the hallmark of the various 
pruning approaches. 
Finally, how is the best subtree to be chosen? 
This presents a problem as a precise form of the 
prior would need to be specified. Quinlan 
[1986b] surveys a number of pruning approaches 
that essentially trade off error with some measure 
of complexity, as equation (2) suggests. In 
practice these would best be parameterised and 
subject to some form of sensitivity analysis, due 
to the imprecision of the prior. 
6. DISCUSSION 
A number of improvements to decision tree 
methods follow from the preceeding analysis. 
Predicting class proportions at decision tree 
nodes is a common decision task not yet handled 
by present ID3-based techniques. Analysis 
similar to that in Section 3 shows reliable class 
proportions may need to be estimated when a 
non-uniform cost structure must be taken 
advantage of. 
An analysis by Breiman et al. [1984] shows 
the difficult nature of the problem. Obstacles to 
developing such methods are several. The modal 
estimate given in Section 5 is a rough and ready 
means of estimating when E._(c!>;)2:0.5 but no 
such estimate for E,t(c!>;) has yet been proposed. 
Applying Laplace's law of succession at the 
nodes is not appropriate because of the way the 
trees have been grown to fit the data [Buda, 
personal communication, Niblett and Bratko 
1987]. The usual Bayesian method of evaluation 
is to approximate a prior using the natural 
conjugate to the updating formula given in (1) 
[Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961, Howard 1970]. This 
is not possible under the similarity hypothesis as 
the natural conjugate is unimodal, whereas the 
prior favouring similarity cannot be, according to 
any reasonable interpretation of similarity or 
simplicity. 
A potential solution is to obtain an estimate 
of E,t(c!>;) by stochastically generating several 
rules of high posterior belief and pooling their <I>;· 
This approximates Eic!>;) because it estimates the 
contribution from the most dominant rules in the 
expectation. 
A revolutionary method of improving the 
decision tree approach is too adopt a better model 
of simplicity. Simplicity of sets of conjunctive 
rules is, in most cases, a more natural measure of 
"simplicity" than simplicity of trees. For 
instance, a disjunction of a few simple 
conjunctions can translate into quite a complex 
tree. Quinlan suggests [1986b] developing rule 
sets instead of trees by a method based on the 
known, efficient tree-building technology. 
Alternatively, a bottom-up method based on 
common AI generalization techniques could be 
used. This has the added advantage that it 
sidesteps the problem of splitting rules altogether 
(although at added computational cost) and allows 
background knowledge to be more flexibly 
incorpomted. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Simplicity and similarity are key issues in 
induction. Bayesian updating is language 
independent so these issues can only become 
relevant either through the choice of prior or 
through some argument involving computational 
constraints. The computational constraints exist 
both because of cognitive constraints on the 
induction product itself, mentioned in Section 2, 
and because of restrictions imposed on the 
induction procedure or the class of hypotheses 
being considered [Pearl1978, Rendell 1986]. We 
have focussed on the choice of prior. We have 
considered the justification and effect of a prior 
favouring simplicity. 
The Bayesian interpretation of decision tree 
methods, utilising this prior, serves to explain 
phenomena such as the practice of pruning, the 
bias by Quinlan's gain heuristic towards multi­
valued attributes and the problems with 
estimating proportions at nodes. 
Furthermore, the similarity hypothesis 
(proposed in Section 4 and shown in Section 5 to 
be implicity assumed for decision tree pruning) 
clearly delimits the kinds of applications to 
which decision tree methods should be 
applicable. 
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